Developing story · Updated November 17, 2026
By the Founders, Department of Technology | San Diego, California | November 17, 2026
Between November 12 and 17, six major U.S. technology failures made headlines: Microsoft 365, the FAA, Chase, United Airlines, Apple and the NSA. Each organization has given its own explanation, and officials say there is no evidence that any of them was a cyberattack. We take that at face value. But the public is entitled to ask whether six failures in six days are a coincidence, a shared cause, or something more, and to expect a clear answer.
This post is a companion to our report on the NSA outage. Below, we lay out what each organization has said, three possible explanations and what each would predict, why we believe the public has a right to the facts, and why we think now is the time for a Department of Technology. The story is still developing. We rely on published reports and say where accounts differ.
The six outages
- Thursday, Nov. 12 · Microsoft 365: Outlook email and Teams meetings were disrupted around the world.
- Friday, Nov. 13 · FAA: A nationwide ground stop lasted more than four hours.
- Monday, Nov. 16 · Chase: Slowdowns spread to customers of other banks, including Zelle transfers.
- Monday, Nov. 16 · United Airlines: A system outage delayed departures.
- Tuesday, Nov. 17 · Apple: Several services, including the App Store and iCloud Mail, were listed as down.
- Tuesday, Nov. 17 · NSA: The internal classified network, NSANet, went down, and the campus closed to most employees by night.
What each organization has said
Here is what has been reported, as of Tuesday night. No two explanations are the same.
- Microsoft. Its preliminary account points to a bug from a July update that became active when extra traffic reached its networking gateways while some server capacity was already unavailable, according to implicator.ai.
- FAA. Officials have not given one consistent explanation. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy blamed old equipment, while Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin pointed to updates added to the old system. The FAA said it found no indication of a cyberattack. We cover the details in The November 13 Ground Stop.
- Chase. The bank said a software bug in its own on-premise hardware caused the slowdown, and that it was not a cyberattack. See our Chase report.
- United. The airline said a technology-related issue affected some departing flights and has been resolved. NBC Chicago reported that some aircraft could not receive critical takeoff data. United’s statement did not tie the outage to the FAA ground stop, and Duffy said he did not know the cause but that it was not related to the FAA, per Cox Media Group.
- Apple. Apple cited an internal update, according to implicator.ai.
- NSA. The agency described “scheduled routine maintenance,” and Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton said a patch for software flaws caused some systems not to come back up. He said there is no sign that the recent outages were a cyberattack. See our NSA report.
What we do not know
The public does not yet know the full root cause of most of these failures. We also do not know whether the incidents share a vendor, a network provider, a software component or an update, or whether anyone has looked for one across sectors. “No evidence of a cyberattack” is a statement about what has been found so far. It is not the same as saying an attack has been ruled out, and early statements can change as investigations continue.
There is also a gap in the NSA account. The agency described routine maintenance, but Al-Monitor quoted a person familiar with the outage who described several interruptions over the past month. That does not point to an attack. It does suggest that the public has not yet been given the full picture.
Three explanations, and what each would predict
We are not claiming to know which of these is right. We are laying them side by side because each one predicts something different, and that makes the question checkable.
- Coincidence under stress. Complex systems fail all the time, and once a few failures make the news, more get noticed. This fits the different causes each organization gave and the fast recoveries. It would predict no shared component and unrelated post-incident reports.
- A common cause that is not an attack. The NSA warned about the PHP flaws and urged organizations to apply patches, and AI tools helped researchers exploit them. Clayton ties the NSA outage to that patching, and Microsoft, the FAA and Chase each cite software bugs or updates. Heavy patching, aging equipment and overloaded systems could produce overlapping failures with no adversary at all. This would predict updates or patch activity in common, and reports describing changes to live systems that were not tested enough.
- Deliberate probing or attack. Those who suspect it point to the PHP flaws, which the NSA warned could let attackers take control of affected web servers, and to the timing: United’s outage came days before Thanksgiving travel, and the NSA’s came as the president traveled in Asia. WDSU reported that experts are not dismissing the timing, and some commentators have gone further and said the country is being probed. No evidence for this has been made public, and officials say they have found none. It would predict shared indicators of compromise, a common vendor or network provider, malicious code in an update, a claim of responsibility, or a joint government advisory.
We are not saying the third is true. We are saying that today the public cannot rule it in or out, and that the difference matters, because the right response to an attack and the right response to a string of bad patches are not the same.
Intentional or not, the public has a right to know the facts
Consider both possibilities. If these were attacks, the public deserves to know what was targeted, what held, and what is being done about it. If they were accidents, the public deserves to know why a routine patch could knock out the NSA’s own network, why one bug or one router could ground flights or slow a bank, and what is changing so it does not happen again. Either way, the facts belong to the people whose flights, savings and security depend on these systems. We believe the public has a right to them.
Today, the public gets those facts from short statements, anonymous sources and cable commentary. In our view, no single office is accountable to voters for answering the cross-sector question, “Is this an attack, and if not, what broke?”
Why now: where a Department of Technology fits, and where it does not
That is the gap a Department of Technology is meant to fill. An elected technology leader with hands-on network experience, as we argue in Back to Basics, would own that question. In practice we see three jobs:
- Look across sectors. Ask whether failures share a vendor, a component or an update, and say so publicly, instead of leaving each organization to explain itself.
- Call for independent review. Our framework includes a Technology Oversight Committee that audits operations and reports to Congress, and a National Technology Security Council for sharing threat information, so that the first hours of an outage produce one consistent answer.
- Publish a plain account. After each major incident, publish an unclassified summary of what failed, whether an attack was found or ruled out, and what will change. Classified details would go to cleared oversight members. This is part of our approach to continuity of government.
A Department of Technology would not run the FAA, a bank or an airline, and it would not have access to the NSA’s classified networks. Those organizations answer to their own regulators and oversight. We also cannot say that our proposal would have prevented any of these outages, since most causes are still unpublished. Our narrower claim is that accountable leaders, independent audits and public reporting make the next outage less likely to be a mystery.
Five questions for officials and lawmakers
- Do these incidents share anything? Is there a common vendor, network provider, software component or update, and will investigators say so publicly?
- How was an attack ruled out, if it was? Have any agencies or companies looked for signs of malicious activity, and what did they check?
- Who looks at the pattern? Which office is responsible for comparing failures across sectors, not only inside each organization?
- How are critical updates tested? Do operators use staged rollouts and rehearsed rollback plans before changes reach live systems? That is our suggestion and goes beyond any rule we know of.
- Will there be a public report each time? Will every organization publish a plain post-incident report, and will classified agencies give the public an unclassified summary?
The bottom line
We do not know whether these six outages share a cause, and neither does the public. The most useful thing officials can do now is say what they have checked, what they have found, and what they will publish. You can help by asking your representatives, candidates and local officials the five questions above, and whether they will commit to a public report after every major outage. Then read what a Department of Technology is and tell us what we have missed.
We will update this post as more is reported.
Our coverage of this week’s outages
New to our proposal?
Learn what a Department of Technology is, and how elected technology leaders would answer to voters when systems fail.
Read the basics
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