Tag: data center regulation

  • Isn’t This Just Another Bureaucracy? Answering the Hardest Questions About Elected Technology Leaders

    By the Founders, Department of Technology | San Diego, California | November 13, 2026

    Our proposal for elected technology leaders at every level of government draws the same skeptical question again and again: aren’t you just adding a layer? It is a fair question. Here are the nine hardest objections we hear, with our best answers and the limits of those answers.

    We would rather be challenged than applauded. If an idea cannot survive its strongest critics, it should not become law. Where we have evidence, we cite it. Where we are making a judgment, we say so.

    1. Isn’t this just another layer of bureaucracy?

    It would be, if it added a layer without removing a gap. The gap is the problem. Today, the pieces of the technology buildout are split across utility commissions, economic development offices, zoning boards, treasurers and workforce agencies, and no one answers to voters for how they fit together. An NBC News review of more than 30 data center proposals in 14 states found that in a majority of cases local officials signed NDAs and worked with what appeared to be shell companies. That is not what a coordinated system looks like. Our test for any new office is whether it replaces confusion with accountability. If it does not, it should not exist. We also think a new office should come with a published cost estimate and a sunset review. We have not priced it for your jurisdiction, and you should be wary of anyone who claims to have done so without details.

    2. Why elected? Why not appoint someone?

    Because the decisions are value judgments. Whose land, whose power bills and whose jobs are tradeoffs, not technical questions, and voters should be able to hold someone to account for them. There is precedent. Voters elect utility commissioners in 10 states, and on November 3 voters in nine states elected 14 members of their state utility commissions. That is not an untested idea. But the record also contains a warning: those races draw far less public attention than other contests on the same ballot, even though the winners will help decide whether data center costs are passed to existing ratepayers. And S&P’s regulatory research unit has long attributed greater investor risk to states where commissioners are elected. So election alone does not guarantee accountability. It needs visibility, and we would pair it with the transparency rules we describe elsewhere.

    3. Don’t utility commissions and other regulators already do this?

    They do part of it, and in some places they do it well. Virginia’s State Corporation Commission, for example, ordered Dominion to develop a tariff to assign more transmission costs directly to data centers. But a utility commission sets rates. It does not decide where a facility is zoned, how much water it may use, what tax breaks it receives or how a county prepares its budget for a downturn. The proposal is not to replace regulators. It is for a technology leader to participate in their proceedings, and to coordinate across the decisions that no single regulator owns.

    4. Won’t an elected technology leader be captured by the industry?

    It is a real risk, and it is a risk for any regulator, elected or appointed. Campaign money, revolving doors and information asymmetry all push in one direction. We would counter it with rules, not hope: publish meetings and calendars, bar NDAs, require recusal where there is a financial interest, and open the records. Those safeguards are our suggestions, not a guarantee. A reasonable person can conclude that appointed, professional regulators are safer than elected ones, and that is a debate we welcome.

    5. Will they have the expertise?

    Not automatically. Elections reward name recognition more than engineering. Some states already set minimum qualifications for commissioners; a Platte Institute research note observes that some states require knowledge or experience in fields such as economics, finance, engineering, energy and law. We would consider something similar, along with a funded professional staff, so that the elected official is accountable for the decisions and the staff supplies the analysis.

    6. Won’t this slow down the buildout and hand China the lead?

    It should not, and if it does, the design has failed. Speed matters. Our concern is that speed without accountability produces backlash that stops projects anyway, as voters showed on November 3 when they favored limits in 40 of 41 local data center measures. Clear rules can also speed things up: AEP Ohio’s large-load pipeline reportedly fell from roughly 30 GW to 13 GW once it had a tariff, which suggests that rules can weed out speculative requests that waste everyone’s time. And Loudoun County credits favorable zoning and fast approvals for accelerating its data center growth. A good technology leader should make the process predictable and fast for projects that meet the standards.

    7. What will it cost?

    We do not have a number for your jurisdiction, and we would not trust one without a detailed budget. The fair comparison is with the cost of the current arrangement, though that is not proof of savings. In Ohio, for example, Policy Matters Ohio reports that a single tax break cost state and local governments about $2 billion in a year, well above the state’s forecast. A small county could begin with a staff director and a part-time advisory board and expand only if it proves its worth.

    8. Isn’t this a partisan project?

    It is not meant to be, and the evidence we rely on is bipartisan. In Virginia, 21 Democrats and seven Republicans in the state Senate voted to curtail a data center tax break. Republican Governor Mike DeWine paused Ohio’s break, and Democratic Governor Andy Beshear called for ending Kentucky’s. Skeptics of the buildout and enthusiasts for it both need an accountable referee. We will count the proposal a failure if one party sees it as a weapon.

    9. Why not let states and markets sort it out?

    They will sort out something. In 2026, 29 states enacted AI legislation, and many local officials are negotiating one deal at a time against a handful of very large buyers, often under NDAs. A patchwork can be a healthy laboratory, and a federal standard may eventually be the right answer. Either way, the people who live next to the project need someone whose job is to speak for them across every decision, not just the one in front of a given committee.

    What would change our mind

    We care about the function more than the title. If a jurisdiction shows that a staff-level technology director, a joint committee or an existing regulator can deliver one accountable owner for the whole picture, with public records and a name voters can hold responsible, we would support that model. If evidence shows elected technology leaders performing worse than appointed ones, we will say so. What we will not accept is the status quo, in which nobody is responsible. Our proposal is at department.technology/.

  • The Data Center Casino: Why America Needs Elected Technology Leaders Now

    By the Founders, Department of Technology | San Diego, California | November 13, 2026

    America needs more data centers. That part is not in dispute. What is in dispute is who decides where they go, who pays for them, and whether anyone is looking at the whole board.

    If the United States wants to remain the world leader in artificial intelligence, it has to build the computing capacity, and the power to run it. We start from that premise. But for several years, officials in both major parties, in red states and blue, have treated new data centers less like public infrastructure and more like a slot machine: pull the lever, hope for a jackpot of investment, tax revenue and ribbon-cuttings, and worry later about who covers the losses.

    The question that has been asked is “how much money can be made?” The question that should be asked is “what is the best outcome for the community that has to live next to this?”

    Three risks pull in three different directions. Build too fast, and we strain an aging grid and inflate a financial bubble. Build too slow, and other countries may make our lead obsolete. Ignore what AI could do to employment, and we erode the tax base a modern society runs on. No one in government is currently accountable for all three at once.

    The casino logic

    Thirty-eight states offer tax incentives to data centers, and at least 28 of them considered scaling those incentives back this year, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures. At least ten states forgo more than $100 million a year in these breaks, with Texas and Virginia each losing as much as $1 billion annually, according to Good Jobs First, as reported by Broadband Breakfast.

    In Ohio, Policy Matters Ohio reports the break cost state and local governments about $2 billion last year, far more than the state had forecast, which led Republican Governor Mike DeWine, who had previously vetoed a repeal, to order a temporary pause.

    The backpedaling is bipartisan, which is exactly the point. In Virginia, 21 Democrats and seven Republicans in the state Senate voted to curtail a 5.3% tax break. Kentucky’s Democratic governor, Andy Beshear, has called for ending his state’s incentives, and Ohio, Arizona, Nebraska and Illinois have paused theirs.

    When lawmakers of both parties are reversing course, the original approach was not a partisan mistake. It was a structural one: the deals were made one project at a time, often in secret (as we noted in our open letter, 25 of 31 Virginia local governments involved in data center development had signed NDAs), and no one owned the cumulative consequences.

    Build too fast: the grid and the bubble

    Our electrical grid is where the cost of speed shows up first. In PJM, the nation’s largest grid market, wholesale power prices jumped almost 76% in the first quarter of 2026 compared with a year earlier, and the market monitor said the price effects on customers were very large and not reversible, according to E&E News.

    Capacity auction prices rose roughly tenfold in two years, from about $29 to $329 per megawatt-day, and the December 2025 auction fell short of its reliability target for the first time, per one analysis of PJM’s results. Ordinary ratepayers are paying for capacity built to serve some of the wealthiest companies in the world.

    Then there is the money behind the buildout. Hyperscalers will spend about $750 billion this year, and they are borrowing heavily to do it, while economy-wide statistics still show little or no productivity growth from AI. Jefferies warns that AI investment was the main driver of U.S. economic growth last year after consumer spending, so a sudden collapse would leave the economy exposed. And The Economist notes that more than half the spending has gone to servers and specialized chips that become obsolete within a few years. A technology can be transformative and still be overbuilt. If that happens, the stranded assets and the unpaid debts will not stay on Wall Street.

    Build too slow: the electron gap

    The opposite risk is just as real. The United States leads in advanced chips but is short on power, while China has the power and is short on chips. BloombergNEF estimates China will add more than six times as much generating capacity as the U.S. over the next five years. Morgan Stanley has forecast a 44-gigawatt shortfall for U.S. data centers within three years, roughly the summertime capacity of New York State. According to calculations reported by The Washington Post, Chinese data centers pay about a third of what American ones do for electricity.

    We cannot answer that gap with moratoriums and lawsuits alone, and we cannot answer it with secrecy and subsidies either. Speed that costs public trust is not speed. As voters showed on November 3, when they favored limits in 40 of 41 local data center measures, communities will stop projects they feel were done to them rather than with them.

    Ignore the jobs: the tax base

    The third risk is the quietest. A RAND analysis found that 84 percent of federal revenue in 2024 came from individual and payroll taxes, both collected from labor income. Because income is concentrated in high-paid white-collar jobs, replacing those roles with AI would hit revenue harder than the headcount suggests, and higher corporate profits would not make up the difference unless corporate tax rates roughly doubled.

    The same logic applies closer to home. New York City’s Comptroller built five AI scenarios for the city’s finances, put a combined 50 percent probability on the three with worse outcomes for jobs, growth or tax revenue, and recommended building a reserve fund to 16 percent of annual tax revenue. Every county and state should be asking the same question before the layoffs arrive, not after.

    Why we need elected technology leaders

    Look at who currently holds a piece of this problem. Utility commissions watch rates. Economic development offices watch ribbon-cuttings. Treasurers watch revenue. Each sees one slice, and none is answerable to voters for the combination. That is how a state can win a data center, lose a billion dollars a year, raise its residents’ power bills and weaken its future tax base, all through decisions that each looked reasonable on its own.

    We are calling for elected technology leaders at the local, county, state and federal levels, with one job: to weigh speed, grid capacity, public cost and long-term fiscal health together, in public. In practice that means:

    • Public plans before approvals. Grid, water and fiscal impact published before a project is approved, not after.
    • No secret deals. Public bodies should not sign NDAs that keep residents from learning what their own governments agreed to.
    • Large users pay for what they trigger. Grid upgrades and capacity costs assigned to the facilities that cause them, not spread across households.
    • Incentives with accountability. Tax breaks tied to measurable jobs and revenue, with clawbacks if the promises are not met.
    • Fiscal readiness for AI displacement. Scenario planning and reserves at every level of government.

    They should be elected, not appointed, because the tradeoffs here are value judgments about whose power bills, whose land and whose jobs, and those belong to voters. And they are needed now because the contracts are being signed now.

    The case against our case

    A fair reading includes the strongest objections.

    • Incentives may be what brings projects at all. The Data Center Coalition’s Dan Diorio argues that revenue estimates overlook the chance a project would never have been built without exemptions, and notes that states with the most growth, including Virginia, Texas and Pennsylvania, offer them, while Colorado, which does not, has less (S&P Global).
    • The electron gap may be overstated. The Brookings Institution cautions that no one knows how many data centers will be needed or how fast chips will become more efficient, and that worries from builders are not the same as geopolitical shocks (Brookings).
    • Job forecasts are uncertain. One UK think tank’s scenarios range from eight million jobs lost to none at all (IPPR), and New York’s Comptroller itself says it is hard to tie current trends to AI with certainty.
    • Another elected office is another layer. Critics may reasonably prefer strengthening utility regulators and legislatures over creating new positions. Our answer is that each existing body owns only a slice, but that is a debate worth having in public.

    Start the conversation

    Neither the casino nor the moratorium is a plan. The country needs people whose job it is to build enough, build in the right places, make the builders pay their share, and prepare for what comes after. That job does not exist yet. We are asking every candidate and every sitting official, of every party, to start the discussion about creating it, at department.technology/.

  • Ten Questions Every Candidate and Elected Official Should Answer About Data Centers and AI

    By the Founders, Department of Technology | San Diego, California | November 13, 2026

    Voters deserve specific answers about who pays for data centers, who is accountable, and what happens if AI does not deliver. Here are ten questions you can put to any candidate or sitting official, with the evidence behind each, what a strong answer sounds like, and what evasion looks like.

    This is a nonpartisan tool. We score the quality of an answer, meaning whether it is specific, honest about tradeoffs and accountable, and not whether it matches our views. A candidate who answers concretely in favor of a policy we would not choose earns the same points as one who answers concretely against it. Send the same ten questions to every candidate, give everyone the same deadline, and publish the answers word for word.

    How to score

    For each question, give each answer 0, 1 or 2 points:

    • 2 points: a clear position, a specific mechanism, and an honest acknowledgment of a tradeoff or limit.
    • 1 point: a clear position without a mechanism, or a mechanism without a position.
    • 0 points: no answer, a deflection, or generalities that could mean anything.

    A total of 16 to 20 suggests a candidate who has thought hard about the whole picture. A total of 10 to 15 suggests a developing view. Below 10 suggests the issue has not yet been taken seriously. This is a conversation tool, not a scientific rating, and we encourage independent groups, newsrooms and civic organizations to score the answers themselves.

    Question 1: Who is accountable?

    The question: If a data center proposal comes before your body, who in government is responsible for weighing power, water, land, taxes and jobs together? Who should be?

    Why it matters: The pieces of this decision are split among utility commissions, economic development offices, zoning boards and treasurers, and no one answers to voters for the combination.

    A strong answer names a person or office and a mechanism, such as a standing committee, a technology director or an elected leader, and says how voters can hold them to account.

    Red flags: “The market will sort it out,” or an answer that lists existing agencies without saying who coordinates them.

    Question 2: Will you sign secret agreements?

    The question: Will you sign a nondisclosure agreement about a development project, and will you support limits on them?

    Why it matters: An NBC News review of more than 30 data center proposals in 14 states found that in a majority of cases local officials signed NDAs. Records requests in Louisiana turned up 54 NDAs signed by elected officials since early 2024. Microsoft says it is working to end active NDAs governments have signed.

    A strong answer gives a clear yes or no, says when confidentiality ends (for example, before any public vote), and explains how legitimate trade secrets would be protected.

    Red flags: “NDAs are standard practice” with no limit, or a blanket promise with no mention of how negotiations would work.

    Question 3: Who pays for the grid?

    The question: Should the largest new electricity users pay the full cost of the grid upgrades built to serve them? Should that be mandatory or optional, and what minimum commitments should they make?

    Why it matters: The Ratepayer Protection Act passed the House 417 to 3 and then failed a Senate procedural vote 57 to 43, largely over whether the protection should be optional or mandatory. At the state level, 23 states had approved at least one large-load tariff as of May. Ohio’s AEP tariff requires 85 percent minimum payments and at least twelve-year contracts, and Dominion’s Virginia tariff requires 14-year contracts and $1.5 million per megawatt of collateral.

    A strong answer takes a side on mandatory versus optional and names at least one term, such as minimum bills, contract length, collateral or exit fees.

    Red flags: “Make Big Tech pay their fair share” with no mechanism, or “markets will handle it.”

    Question 4: Do you support tax breaks, and on what conditions?

    The question: Do you support tax incentives for data centers? If so, what conditions, such as job targets, sunset dates and clawbacks, should come with them? If not, why not?

    Why it matters: Thirty-eight states offer data center incentives, and at least 28 considered scaling them back this year. In Ohio, the break cost state and local governments about $2 billion in a year. The jobs are mostly temporary: an Illinois study projected 121,000 jobs from $57 billion of investment, but only 2,800 permanent direct positions, while a Reno facility’s records estimated 73 permanent jobs.

    A strong answer takes a position either way, separates temporary from permanent jobs, and says how results would be measured.

    Red flags: Quoting job totals without saying how many are permanent, or promising “jobs and growth” without numbers.

    Question 5: Who gets a say before approval?

    The question: Should data centers be allowed by right, or should each one require a public hearing and discretionary approval? Where should the final decision sit?

    Why it matters: Loudoun County eliminated by-right zoning for data centers, and Harrisonburg, Virginia, moved them to special-use permits. Loudoun also credits favorable zoning and fast approvals for accelerating its growth. There is a real tradeoff between speed and consent.

    A strong answer describes a process, such as hearings, timelines and standards, and acknowledges the tradeoff.

    Red flags: “Let the community decide” with no process, or “get out of the way” with no protection for residents.

    Question 6: What about water, land and cleanup?

    The question: What studies, standards and financial guarantees should a data center have to meet for water, noise, farmland and eventual closure?

    Why it matters: Linn County, Iowa, requires a water study and a water-use agreement before construction and also covers decommissioning bonds. Few places have anything comparable.

    A strong answer names specific requirements and who would enforce them.

    Red flags: “Environmentally responsible” with no specifics.

    Question 7: How do we build enough, fast enough?

    The question: How would you make sure America builds enough power and computing capacity to compete, without bypassing the public?

    Why it matters: BloombergNEF expects China to add more than six times as much generating capacity as the United States over five years, and Morgan Stanley has forecast a 44-gigawatt shortfall for U.S. data centers. At the same time, AEP Ohio’s pipeline reportedly fell from roughly 30 GW to 13 GW once it had a tariff, so not every request is real.

    A strong answer addresses generation, transmission and permitting, and distinguishes real projects from speculative ones.

    Red flags: An answer that is only “beat China” or only “stop the data centers.”

    Question 8: Who bears the loss if the boom slows?

    The question: If AI investment slows or reverses, who bears the losses, and what would you do now so residents are not left holding the bag?

    Why it matters: Hyperscalers will spend about $750 billion this year, borrowing heavily. Jefferies warns that AI investment was the main driver of U.S. economic growth last year after consumer spending, and The Economist notes that more than half the spending goes to equipment that becomes obsolete within a few years.

    A strong answer names protections such as collateral, minimum bills, exit fees or cleanup bonds, without predicting a crash.

    Red flags: Either “this can’t fail” or doom with no plan.

    Question 9: What is your plan for the tax base?

    The question: Has your government modeled what happens to revenue if AI displaces significant work, or if data center revenue falls? What reserves and triggers are in place?

    Why it matters: A RAND analysis found that 84 percent of federal revenue comes from individual and payroll taxes. Loudoun County reports that data centers generate 38 percent of its general fund revenue, and New York City’s Comptroller recommended a reserve of 16 percent of annual tax revenue in response to AI risk.

    A strong answer says what share of revenue is exposed and describes a scenario plan and reserve.

    Red flags: “We’ll cross that bridge when we come to it.”

    Question 10: Should Congress override state AI laws?

    The question: Should federal law preempt state AI rules? If so, what federal protections and enforcement would replace them, and who would administer them? (For state and local candidates: what role should your jurisdiction keep?)

    Why it matters: The Senate voted 99 to 1 against an early preemption proposal, while 29 states enacted AI legislation in 2026. Even the White House’s approach would leave data center infrastructure to the states.

    A strong answer takes a position, names the enforcement mechanism and says who is accountable for it.

    Red flags: “Washington can’t be trusted” or “states can’t be trusted” with no alternative.

    Which questions fit which office

    • City council or county board: Questions 1, 2, 5, 6 and 9.
    • State legislature or governor: Questions 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 10.
    • Congress: Questions 3, 7, 8, 9 and 10.
    • Bonus question for everyone: Will you publish your meetings with developers, utilities and lobbyists on this issue?

    The case against our case

    • Scorecards reward rehearsed answers. A well-coached candidate can sound specific without meaning it. That is why we ask for mechanisms and why we suggest publishing answers in full and comparing them with later votes.
    • Not every office has the power. A county commissioner cannot set federal policy, and a member of Congress cannot rezone land. The “which office” guide above is meant to keep the questions fair.
    • Ten questions oversimplify. Real issues have more dimensions, and some candidates will rightly say “it depends.” We would count a thoughtful “it depends”, with the conditions named, as a strong answer.
    • We might be seen as scoring for our side. Our proposal for elected technology leaders is not the only acceptable answer to Question 1, and a different structure can score full points. We would prefer that a neutral organization do the scoring.

    Print-ready list

    1. Who in government is responsible for weighing power, water, land, taxes and jobs together, and who should be?
    2. Will you sign a nondisclosure agreement about a development project, and will you support limits on them?
    3. Should the largest new electricity users pay the full cost of grid upgrades built to serve them, and should that be mandatory or optional?
    4. Do you support tax incentives for data centers, and on what conditions?
    5. Should data centers be allowed by right, or require a public hearing and discretionary approval?
    6. What studies, standards and guarantees should a data center meet for water, noise, land and cleanup?
    7. How would you make sure America builds enough power and capacity to compete, without bypassing the public?
    8. If AI investment slows, who bears the losses, and what would you do now to protect residents?
    9. Has your government modeled what happens to revenue if AI displaces work or data center revenue falls?
    10. Should Congress override state AI laws, and if so, what replaces them and who administers it?

    Use it

    Send these to every candidate and every sitting official you can reach, at every level, and ask for answers in writing by a stated date. Publish what comes back. If you are a candidate, answer before you are asked. Our proposal is at department.technology/.

  • How a Data Center Deal Actually Gets Made, and Where the Public Gets Left Out

    By the Founders, Department of Technology | San Diego, California | November 13, 2026

    Most data center deals are shaped long before residents hear a word. Here is a step-by-step walk through how a typical one comes together, who decides at each stage, where the public is shut out, and what an accountable technology leader would change.

    No two deals are identical, and we do not claim every project follows this path. Some officials negotiate openly, and some developers welcome scrutiny. But the pattern below appears again and again in public records and investigations, and understanding it is the first step to changing it.

    Step 1: A site is chosen, and it is not about you

    Data center developers pick locations for electricity access, water rights and fiber connectivity, not for population or local jobs, according to a Quartz analysis of the industry’s land-acquisition playbook. Your community may be on a list for reasons no one has told you.

    Who decides: the developer. Where the public is left out: everywhere; no one has been told. What would change: a technology leader would know the utility’s pipeline and whether your community is on it (see our first-year guide).

    Step 2: Land is quietly secured

    The next move is usually to lock up land. The most common tools are, according to that same analysis, shell LLCs, nondisclosure agreements, land options that tie up parcels before public review, and intermediary buyers acting for unnamed principals. The practice is old. In 2019, the Washington Post reported that Google had used shell companies in negotiations with at least five cities, and in Iowa created one LLC for the land sale and another for the development deal.

    There is a legitimate reason for some of this. Once a famous buyer is identified, land prices can jump sharply; the article cites Disney in Florida, where prices rose more than 1,000 percent. Sellers deserve a fair price, and developers deserve a fair negotiation. The question is how long secrecy should last and who else is kept out.

    Step 3: Officials sign NDAs, and projects get code names

    Local officials are then asked to sign confidentiality agreements. An NBC News review of more than 30 data center proposals across 14 states found that in most cases local officials signed NDAs and dealt with what appeared to be shell companies. In Louisiana, public records requests turned up 54 NDAs signed by elected officials since early 2024, and the agreements covered projects under code names like “Project Lightning.” In Minnesota, a project near Hermantown, code-named “Project Loon,” was identified as a data center only after the Star Tribune obtained public records, by which point the city had already changed land use plans and carried out preliminary environmental review.

    Who decides: a handful of local and state economic development officials. Where the public is left out: the officials who sign cannot discuss it, even with their own colleagues or constituents. What would change: a policy that the jurisdiction does not sign NDAs on development matters, with trade secrets protected by narrower means.

    Step 4: The utility is asked for power

    In parallel, the developer asks the utility for a connection. AEP Ohio, for example, charges a one-time fee of $10,000 to $100,000 for each load study and requires it to be paid within 45 days or the customer forfeits its place. These queues can be full of placeholders. AEP Ohio was facing 30 gigawatts of potential new load before its data center tariff, and one analysis found that its pipeline fell from roughly 30 GW to 13 GW after the tariff took effect.

    Who decides: the utility, under rules set by the state commission. Where the public is left out: the pipeline is rarely published, so local officials may not know which requests are real. What would change: public reporting of large-load requests by jurisdiction, and a local seat in the commission proceeding.

    Step 5: Incentives are negotiated

    The developer then seeks tax relief. In the Midlothian, Texas, case the Post described, Google reportedly used a shell company to negotiate a $10 million tax incentive with local officials. At the state level, thirty-eight states offer incentives, and in Ohio the break cost state and local governments about $2 billion last year, according to Policy Matters Ohio, far more than forecast. Those figures come from the incentive programs themselves, not from one negotiation, but they show the scale of what is decided in small rooms.

    Who decides: state and local economic development officials. Where the public is left out: the cost-benefit analysis, if one exists, is often not public. What would change: published cost-benefit analyses before approval, and clawbacks if promises are missed.

    Step 6: Land use is approved

    Only now does the public typically see a rezoning request or a site plan. If data centers are allowed by right, there may be no hearing at all. By this stage, the land is secured, the utility has been approached and the incentives are drafted, so the room to say no is small. In Hermantown, by one account, officials turned away questions from nearby residents about whether the project was a data center.

    Who decides: the planning commission and the county board or council. Where the public is left out: the decision arrives late and often looks finished. What would change: special-use permits instead of by-right approval, and a requirement for a public hearing with full disclosure before anything is signed.

    Step 7: The power contract is signed

    The utility and the developer sign a service agreement. In states with large-load tariffs, these carry minimum bills, long terms and collateral. Dominion’s Virginia tariff, for example, calls for 14-year minimum contracts and $1.5 million per megawatt of collateral. Elsewhere, the terms are weaker or negotiated one at a time. Who bears the risk if the facility closes or never fills is a question of contract design, and most residents never see the contract.

    Step 8: Construction, jobs and revenue

    Then the buildings go up. The jobs promised are mostly short-term. A Reno facility’s business records estimated 73 permanent jobs against more than 4,000 temporary construction jobs. An Illinois study projected that $57 billion of new data center investment would create 121,000 jobs, but only 2,800 would be direct, permanent positions, or about $20 million of investment per permanent job. Brookings researchers found effects of roughly 100 to 200 jobs at a typical affected county, along with a modest increase in home prices of 2 to 5 percent, and noted the effects vary by facility type.

    On the other side of the ledger, the tax revenue can be large. Loudoun County, Virginia, reports that data centers produce 38 percent of its general fund revenue on about 4 percent of its commercial land.

    The pattern

    Laid end to end, the steps show a consistent shape: the biggest decisions happen early, in private and without a public voice, and the public hearing arrives after the key commitments have been made. That is not necessarily bad faith. Many officials believe they are protecting a competitive negotiation, and many developers are responsive once the project is public. But a system that depends on goodwill at every step will not protect residents when goodwill runs out.

    The case against our case

    • Officials say NDAs are necessary. Louisiana’s economic development secretary told NPR that NDAs are “fundamental for economic development”, allowing the state to compete. Her point deserves weight. On the other hand, a parish president in the same state said economic development does not require NDAs, chose not to use them, and still saw a $10 billion data center built.
    • Early secrecy can protect sellers. As noted above, a named buyer can inflate land prices, so a limited period of confidentiality may serve landowners. We would limit it to land transactions and end it before any public vote.
    • The jobs numbers are disputed. A Maryland Tech Council study, for example, estimated that a typical 800,000-square-foot data center would support nearly 500 permanent jobs, a far higher figure than other studies, according to one review of the evidence, which also cites a Virginia state audit that found far fewer.
    • Many deals are fine. Some projects are welcomed by communities and deliver what they promise. The goal is not to stop deals but to make sure the public can see them before they close.

    What to do with this

    If you serve on a council or board, ask where your community is in this sequence, and who has signed what. If you are a resident, request the NDAs and incentive agreements under your state’s public records law. And if you are a candidate, tell voters who in your government is responsible for each of these eight steps. Right now, the honest answer in most places is that nobody is responsible for all of them. Our proposal is at department.technology/.

  • A Technology Leader’s First Year: A Guide for Counties and Cities

    By the Founders, Department of Technology | San Diego, California | November 13, 2026

    Most county boards and city councils are being asked to approve the largest infrastructure projects in their history with a planning staff built for strip malls. This is a practical first-year guide for the person whose job it should be to fix that.

    Our proposal calls for elected technology leaders at the local and county level. What would one actually do? Everything below has been tried somewhere, in communities of different sizes and politics. We cite examples as examples, not endorsements, and we flag where the evidence is thin. Local law varies, so check with your county attorney before adopting anything binding.

    Months 1 to 3: Find out what is coming, and stop the clock

    Inventory the pipeline. Ask your utility how many large-load connection requests are sitting in your territory, how many megawatts they represent, and how many are speculative or duplicated. This matters. AEP Ohio was facing 30 gigawatts of potential new load before it adopted a data center tariff, and one analysis found its pipeline fell from roughly 30 GW to 13 GW after the tariff took effect, suggesting much of the reported demand was speculative or duplicated across utilities. A local government that cannot tell the real projects from the placeholders cannot plan.

    End by-right approval. In March, the Loudoun County Board of Supervisors eliminated by-right zoning for data centers. Harrisonburg, Virginia, moved data centers to special-use permits, which routes proposals through public hearings and discretionary review. A Brookings researcher has recommended never allowing by-right data center development. Where a pause is needed, treat it as a tool with a work plan and an end date. A Federation of American Scientists review found that local moratoria share the same stated rationale: the zoning code does not yet define data centers, so the jurisdiction needs time to study impacts and draft rules.

    Ask the standard questions. Cuyahoga County’s playbook urges communities to ask about power demand, water use, grid upgrades, backup generators, jobs, infrastructure costs and decommissioning plans. Put those questions in writing and make every applicant answer them in public.

    Months 4 to 6: Write the rules

    Linn County, Iowa, adopted one of the most detailed local frameworks so far. Its ordinance requires a water study as part of the zoning application and a water-use agreement with the county before construction, and it also covers noise, light, road use and decommissioning bonds. The board finalized it unanimously after three readings and multiple public hearings. In Scott County, Kentucky, a draft ordinance would bar data centers from prime farmland and wetlands, require developers to pay for water system upgrades, and require a cleanup bond.

    One caution. Jefferson County’s committee worked to keep its draft legally defensible under recent Supreme Court rulings on land-use exactions. In general, what you demand has to relate to the project’s actual impacts. Have counsel review the ordinance before you adopt it.

    Months 6 to 9: Get a seat in the rate case

    Your county does not set electricity rates, but it lives with them. The state utility commission does the setting, and many have recently created separate rules for the largest customers. According to the Edison Electric Institute, 23 states had approved at least one large-load tariff as of May 2026, with seven more pending. Ohio’s AEP tariff applies to data centers above 25 megawatts, requires them to pay at least 85 percent of contracted capacity and commits them to initial contracts of at least twelve years. Dominion’s Virginia tariff sets 14-year minimum contracts and $1.5 million per megawatt of collateral. A Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory brief lists minimum billing demand, exit fees and collateral as common building blocks.

    Find out whether your utility has such a tariff and, if not, whether a proceeding is pending. In many states, local governments can file comments or intervene, so ask your counsel. A county technology leader’s job is to make sure the people who live there are represented where the cost allocation is decided.

    Months 7 to 9: Negotiate in public

    Use community benefit agreements, carefully. The Federation of American Scientists found only eight data center community benefit agreements when it looked. Lancaster’s covers transparency, water, energy, noise, public works and decommissioning, but the reviewers noted it leaves much of the substance to be decided later, and that tax breaks can outweigh any financial benefit a community receives. The lesson is to write numbers and enforcement into the agreement now.

    Do not sign NDAs. Bloomberg Law reports that Microsoft is working to end any active NDAs governments have signed. Proposed Minnesota legislation would require at least two public hearings and disclosure of key details, including the company behind a project. You do not need to wait for a state law. A local government can adopt a policy that it will not sign NDAs on development matters and will post proposals, incentive terms and cost-benefit analyses on its website.

    Months 10 to 12: Budget for the upside and the downside

    Data center revenue can be a windfall, and it can be a trap. We cover the budgeting in a companion piece, “What Every County Treasurer Should Model Before AI Layoffs.” For your first-year report, the minimum is this: publish how much of your general fund depends on data centers, what happens to that revenue if equipment values fall, and what reserve you are holding against it.

    Then publish the whole first year in plain language: projects reviewed, conditions imposed, public hearings held and agreements signed.

    Your first week

    1. Ask the utility for the pipeline numbers. Megawatts, projects and status.
    2. Check your zoning. Is a data center allowed by right anywhere in your jurisdiction?
    3. Find out what has been signed. Any NDAs, development agreements or incentive deals.

    The case against our case

    • Data centers pay more than they cost. Speakers at a National Taxpayers Union discussion said Loudoun County receives about $26 in tax revenue for every $1 spent on services for data centers. Industry advocates argue that heavy requirements and delays can send projects, and that revenue, elsewhere. Loudoun itself credits favorable zoning and fast approvals for accelerating its growth, even though it later ended by-right approval. A good technology leader should make the process predictable and fast for projects that meet the standards, not just slower.
    • Small counties lack the expertise. A rural county may not be able to staff a water study or a rate-case intervention. That argues for shared staff across counties, or for state technical help, and we would support both.
    • Legal limits are real. Exaction rules constrain what localities can demand, and, as the FAS review shows, many agreements stay vague. This is a reason to involve counsel early, not to skip the work.
    • It might not need to be an elected office. A county could assign this to a staff director. Our view is that elected officials are accountable to voters for the tradeoffs, but a staff role is a sensible first step.

    Start with one question

    If your community is being asked to approve a data center this year, ask the person proposing it a single question: who in our government is responsible for the whole picture of power, water, land, taxes and jobs? If the answer is nobody, that is the position to fill. Find our proposal at department.technology/.

  • The First 100 Days: A Technology Agenda for the Next Congress

    By the Founders, Department of Technology | San Diego, California | November 13, 2026

    A new Congress has 100 days to show it can govern the technology buildout instead of reacting to it. Here is a practical agenda that members of either party can sign onto.

    In our last piece, we described five mistakes the previous Congress made on data centers and AI. This one is the to-do list. We built it from items that already have bipartisan footprints, because the fastest agenda is one that members have already voted for, sponsored or said they support. One timing note: bills that do not become law expire when a Congress ends, so even measures that passed one chamber, like the Ratepayer Protection Act, have to be introduced again.

    1. Days 1 to 30: Hold one set of hearings on the whole picture

    Today the pieces of this problem sit in different committees. Energy committees see the grid. Commerce committees see competitiveness. Finance and tax committees see revenue. Each hears from its own witnesses, and nobody hears the tradeoffs.

    Hold a joint hearing series with the same witnesses in the same room: grid operators, state utility regulators, economists, county officials and workers. The evidence on each risk is already strong enough to start. In the largest U.S. grid market, wholesale power prices rose almost 76 percent in a year and the market monitor called the effects irreversible. At the same time, BloombergNEF expects China to add more than six times as much generating capacity as the United States over five years. Members should hear both facts at once.

    2. Days 1 to 45: Reintroduce ratepayer protection and settle the real disagreement

    The Ratepayer Protection Act cleared the House Energy and Commerce Committee 52 to 0, passed the House 417 to 3, and then failed a Senate procedural vote 57 to 43 that needed 60. The two sides disagreed about one question: whether states should merely be required to consider making large data centers pay for the grid upgrades built to serve them, or whether the cost allocation should be mandatory, as in the Democratic GRID Savings Act.

    Both positions have a principled basis. Utility regulation has long been a state responsibility, and voluntary pledges have a mixed record. We suggest negotiators look for a middle design: a mandatory core for the very largest new loads, with states keeping flexibility over how to implement it. That is our suggestion, not a settled answer, and the details matter. The point is to have the argument in February rather than the weeks before an election.

    3. Days 30 to 60: Open the deals

    Secret agreements are the issue where public frustration is highest and the policy fix is simplest. Bloomberg Law found that 25 of 31 proposed data center projects in Virginia involved nondisclosure agreements, and that Microsoft says it is working to end any active NDAs governments have signed. Lawmakers in more than a dozen states have introduced bills to ban such agreements, but only Delaware has passed a transparency measure through its legislature, according to MLex. A bipartisan group in Congress has now introduced a federal bill to ban NDAs that keep officials from discussing proposed data center projects, while protecting trade secrets.

    Move that bill. And because Congress’s reach is strongest where federal assets are involved, require public disclosure of any data center deal that touches federal land, federal funds or federal permits.

    4. Days 60 to 90: Ask the revenue question before the layoffs

    We do not know how much AI will displace work, and forecasts vary widely. We do know how exposed the tax base is if it does. A RAND analysis found that 84 percent of federal revenue in 2024 came from individual and payroll taxes, and that losing high-paid white-collar jobs would hurt revenue disproportionately. New York City’s Comptroller has already modeled five AI scenarios for the city’s finances.

    Ask the Congressional Budget Office and the Government Accountability Office to publish scenario analyses of federal revenue under different displacement paths, and encourage states and counties to do the same. Planning for a range of outcomes is not predicting the worst one.

    5. Days 90 to 100: Name an owner

    Every item above would be easier to carry out, and harder to forget, if someone were accountable for them together. Begin by creating a standing joint committee with jurisdiction over the whole technology buildout. Then open the larger debate about a Department of Technology and elected technology leaders at the local, county, state and federal levels, including a Secretary of Technology.

    Two rules for all 100 days

    • No riders. Questions as large as federal preemption of state AI laws should not be decided inside a defense or budget bill. They need their own hearings and their own text.
    • Settle the hard disagreements early. The last Congress’s one bipartisan success stalled because the central dispute surfaced a few weeks before Election Day.

    The case against our case

    A fair agenda includes the strongest objections.

    • It is too much, too fast. Skeptics will say five items in 100 days is unrealistic, especially in a Senate that needs 60 votes for most bills. We would rather offer a full list and let members pick; the first two items are the most achievable.
    • Congress has limited reach over local contracts. A federal NDA ban cannot easily dictate how a city signs agreements except through federal funding, permits or land. Developers also argue that confidentiality protects competitive information, and Microsoft has said the agreements were meant to protect sensitive information. The bill’s trade-secret carve-out is where this fight will be decided.
    • Mandatory cost allocation could raise costs or slow building. Supporters of the optional approach worry that rigid federal standards could discourage investment at a moment when the country needs more capacity.
    • Revenue scenarios are speculative. The same New York report acknowledges it is hard to connect today’s hiring trends to AI with certainty. We agree, which is why we ask for a range of scenarios and not a single forecast.

    Start now

    None of this requires a party to give up its principles. It requires members to decide that the question of who is accountable for the technology buildout is theirs to answer. We will keep publishing the evidence and we will tell you plainly when we think a proposal falls short. Our proposal is at department.technology/.

  • Preemption Without an Owner: Why the Federal-State AI Fight Needs Someone Accountable

    By the Founders, Department of Technology | San Diego, California | November 13, 2026

    Washington is arguing over whether federal law should override state AI rules. Both sides have real arguments. But whoever wins, someone has to enforce the result and answer to voters for it, and right now no one does.

    Few questions in technology policy have produced more heat than federal preemption: whether Congress should replace the growing body of state AI laws with a single national standard. This piece does not argue that preemption is right or wrong. We lay out the strongest case on each side, review what the record shows, and make one claim that holds under either outcome: a national standard, or a patchwork, without a named, accountable owner is not a policy. It is a vacuum.

    The case for a national standard

    Supporters of preemption make an argument that deserves a fair hearing. AI development does not stop at state borders, they say, and companies facing dozens of different rules face rising compliance costs that favor the largest firms. In December 2025, a presidential executive order called for a uniform national framework, directed the Justice Department to challenge state laws it deemed onerous, and tied some federal broadband funding to state policy. Industry groups and senators including Ted Cruz have argued for explicit federal preemption of conflicting state laws, and some supporters now say the longer Congress waits, the harder preemption becomes as more state laws pile up.

    In March 2026, the White House sent Congress a national framework that called for preempting burdensome state AI laws, with exceptions for child safety, general consumer-protection and fraud laws, state procurement and state zoning for AI infrastructure.

    The case against

    Opponents make an equally serious argument. States, they say, are closer to the people affected and can respond faster than Congress, and preemption without enforceable federal protections would leave residents with fewer remedies than they have today. The opposition has been broad. In July 2025, the Senate voted 99 to 1 against a proposed state AI moratorium. When it returned in the defense bill, more than 300 state lawmakers from across the political spectrum urged Congress to reject it, and prominent Republicans including Senator Josh Hawley, Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene and Arkansas Governor Sarah Huckabee Sanders spoke against it. The defense bill text did not include the moratorium, and House Republican leaders were left searching for another vehicle.

    What the record shows

    Whatever one thinks of preemption, the practical result so far is a stalemate. Two attempts to attach it to must-pass bills failed. The White House framework has not become law. By one account, Congress left for its August recess without moving a federal AI framework out of committee. Meanwhile, 29 states enacted AI legislation in 2026, and for the first time both Republican- and Democratic-led states passed laws adding requirements or oversight for data centers.

    The states did not wait for permission, and no one in Washington was positioned to tell them to stop or to give them something better to follow.

    The part both sides already agree on

    Here is the detail that gets lost in the argument. Even the strongest preemption proposals carve out data center infrastructure. The December executive order said legislation should not preempt state laws on data center infrastructure, and the March framework would leave state zoning for AI infrastructure in place. In other words, the people who favor the broadest national standard agree that decisions about where data centers go, how they are powered and who pays remain local and state decisions.

    That has a consequence. Whatever Congress decides about model rules, child safety or algorithmic discrimination, the data center decisions that voters care about most, and that voted on November 3, will be made by city councils, county boards, state utility commissions and legislatures. Those officials are making multibillion-dollar decisions with no technology counterpart whose job it is to see the whole picture.

    Where the owner is missing under each outcome

    • If broad preemption passes, a federal standard replaces state rules. Who enforces it, who updates it as the technology changes, and who do residents call when it fails? Without an accountable federal office, critics of preemption are right that residents lose remedies.
    • If preemption fails, the patchwork grows. Companies face rules that differ by state, and states and counties negotiate against the same few buyers with little shared information. Without a coordinating office, supporters of a national standard are right that the burden falls hardest on smaller firms and communities.
    • If a narrow hybrid passes, federal and state authority meet at a boundary that will be contested. Someone has to be accountable for where that boundary sits and for what falls through it.

    In every case, the missing piece is the same: an office that answers to voters for how the system works as a whole.

    Three tests for any national AI standard

    We take no position on how broad preemption should be. We do suggest three tests for any proposal, from any party:

    1. Is the federal protection enforceable? If a national standard replaces state rules, it should carry real enforcement and clear remedies, not just guidance.
    2. Is there a named, accountable official? Someone should be answerable to voters, and to Congress, for how the standard is administered and updated.
    3. Does it keep data center decisions local and public? Siting, rates and disclosure of public deals should stay with local and state governments, with transparency rules attached.

    And a procedural test: was it debated on its own, with hearings and a public text, instead of inside a must-pass bill?

    The case against our case

    • Accountability can be built into existing agencies. Some will say a regulator or a White House coordinator could play this role without a new elected office. That is a reasonable design, though we think voters should be able to hold someone to account directly.
    • Local decisions are the problem. Some supporters of preemption believe local control over data centers is what slows the buildout, and would prefer more federal permitting authority. The administration has proposed streamlining federal permitting for AI data centers, and reasonable people can weigh that against local consent.
    • It adds a layer. Another layer of officials could slow decisions. We would answer that the status quo already has many layers and no owner, but we welcome the debate.

    The question underneath

    The preemption fight will continue, and we hope it is resolved by open debate and not by rider. But the question underneath it will not go away: when the technology goes wrong, or when it goes right and the gains are not shared, who is responsible? We think the answer should be someone voters can elect, at every level of government. Find our proposal at department.technology/.

  • A Briefing for the New Congress: What the Last Two Years Got Wrong, and What to Do Differently

    By the Founders, Department of Technology | San Diego, California | November 13, 2026

    To the newly elected: you are about to inherit the most consequential technology decisions in a generation, and the last Congress left you a map of what not to do.

    This is not a partisan scorecard. The record we describe below includes members of both parties acting in good faith and members of both parties falling short. Newly elected members of Congress are sworn in this January, and we think you are better served by an honest account of what happened than by a flattering one. We start with what worked.

    What the last Congress got right

    It is easy to say Congress did nothing on data centers. That is not quite true. In July, the House Energy and Commerce Committee passed the Ratepayer Protection Act 52 to 0, a bill from Republican Gabe Evans and Democrat Kathy Castor. In September, the full House passed it 417 to 3 under a procedure that required a two-thirds majority. The bill would require state utility regulators to consider standards that make large data center customers pay the full cost of the grid upgrades built to serve them. In a polarized era, that is a real accomplishment, and it shows what is possible when members start from a problem their constituents can feel: the electric bill.

    Then came the mistakes.

    Mistake 1: Trying to pass the big thing through the back door

    For two years, advocates of a national AI framework tried to move federal preemption of state AI laws by attaching it to must-pass bills. Those efforts, including the defense authorization bill and the 2025 budget reconciliation law, were unsuccessful. Senators rejected a broad preemption proposal 99 to 1. In March 2026, the White House sent Congress a national policy framework that again called for preempting burdensome state laws while carving out areas such as child safety and state zoning for AI infrastructure. By one account, Congress left for its August recess without moving a federal AI framework out of committee.

    The lesson is not that preemption is right or wrong. Reasonable people disagree, and we lay out both sides below. The lesson is that a question this large cannot be settled by rider. It needs its own hearings, its own text and its own public debate.

    Mistake 2: Letting the one agreement become a campaign prop

    The Ratepayer Protection Act did not stall because no one wanted it. It stalled because of how it arrived. On September 30, five weeks before Election Day, the Senate voted 57 to 43 on a procedural motion that needed 60 votes. Only four Democrats voted yes.

    The two sides told different stories, and each has a serious argument:

    • Republican supporters said the bill had passed the House almost unanimously, with Democratic votes and Democratic cosponsors, and accused Senate Democrats of refusing to take yes for an answer for political reasons.
    • Senate Democrats said the bill’s core protection is optional, since states need only consider standards, and offered their own GRID Savings Act to make large customers actually pay for grid upgrades. Senator Schumer called the Republican bill “optional” and toothless.

    We take no side on optional versus mandatory. We do note that Reuters reported Senate Republicans aimed to improve their midterm prospects with the vote, and that the bill arrived at the end of the session, after the Senate had not moved on data centers for months. A measure introduced in July and brought to a test vote in the last weeks before an election will be judged as a campaign move whatever its merits. The practical lesson for new members: if you want a data center bill to become law, negotiate the mandatory-versus-optional question in the spring, not the fall.

    Mistake 3: Solving one slice of a three-part problem

    Even if the Ratepayer Protection Act had passed, it would have addressed one of three risks we described in our earlier piece, “The Data Center Casino.” It deals with who pays for grid upgrades. It does not address how fast we can build power to compete with China, the financial exposure if the AI investment boom turns, or what happens to federal and state revenue if AI displaces high-paid white-collar work. Congress legislated the slice that polls well. No committee is responsible for the whole.

    Mistake 4: Leaving a vacuum for states and for secret local deals

    When Congress does not act, others do. In 2026, 29 states enacted AI legislation, and for the first time both Republican- and Democratic-led states passed laws adding requirements or oversight for data centers. That is encouraging, and it is also a patchwork. Meanwhile, at the local level, many deals are still negotiated under non-disclosure agreements. As we noted in our open letter, 25 of 31 Virginia local governments involved in data center development had signed NDAs. Residents learn about the largest infrastructure project in their county after the decision is made.

    Mistake 5: Nobody owns it

    This is the mistake underneath the others. AI, data centers, the power grid, student data, surveillance and the workforce are governed by a patchwork of committees and agencies. Each handles a slice, and no one is accountable to voters for how the slices fit together. We raised this directly. In February 2025 we submitted a proposal to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy for a national AI action plan, and in July 2025 we published a response to the plan that followed. We have not had a substantive engagement with either. We mention it not as a complaint, since a good idea should not depend on one administration, but because it illustrates the structural problem: there was no office whose job it was to say yes or no.

    What new members can do in the first 100 days

    1. Hold hearings on the whole picture. Grid capacity, public cost, competitiveness and fiscal impact together, with the same witnesses in the same room.
    2. Settle optional versus mandatory early. Bring Republicans and Democrats who both voted for ratepayer protection into one room and write the version that can reach 60 votes.
    3. Keep big structural questions out of must-pass bills. Preemption, if it happens, should be debated on its own.
    4. Open the deals. Require public disclosure of data center agreements that involve public land, public utilities or public incentives.
    5. Create a single point of accountability. At minimum, a standing joint committee with jurisdiction over the whole question. Ideally, an elected technology leader at every level of government, including a Secretary of Technology at the federal level, whose job is to answer to voters for the combination.

    The case against our case

    A fair briefing includes the strongest objections.

    • Preemption advocates argue a patchwork of state laws slows innovation and that national competitiveness requires one national standard, and they note that the longer Congress waits, the harder preemption becomes as states pass more laws (Broadband Breakfast). Opponents respond that preemption without enforceable federal protections would leave residents with fewer remedies.
    • Optional standards may be the right design. Supporters of the Ratepayer Protection Act argue that utility regulation has long been a state responsibility and that a federal mandate would overreach. Critics respond that voluntary pledges have not been enough.
    • Congress already has committees for this. Some will say the problem is political will, not structure, and that a new office adds a layer. Our view is that structure shapes will: when every committee owns a slice, no one is blamed for the whole. But we welcome the argument.

    The first step

    The new Congress does not need to solve everything in January. It needs to stop treating the central question, who is accountable for the technology buildout, as someone else’s job. Start the conversation about a Department of Technology and elected technology leaders at every level. We will help, and we will be honest with you when we think you are wrong. Find our proposal at department.technology/.

  • Voters Didn’t Reject AI. They Rejected Building It Backward


    By the Founders, Department of Technology | San Diego, California | November 9, 2026


    Voters Didn’t Reject AI in 2026. The ever-increasing number of paid memberships for OpenAI, Anthropic (Claude AI), Google Gemini, and others has proved this to be the case.

    They Rejected Building It Backward.

    On November 3rd, voters across ten states said no to data centers almost every time they were asked. The reason is not that they oppose AI. It is that they have watched the buildout run ahead of the power grid, and they suspect the people steering it are not putting the public first.

    In Ashville, Ohio, the village council had already approved an agreement with a data center developer. Residents petitioned to put it on the ballot anyway. On Election Day, 82% of voters rejected the deal, according to Northeast Ohio reporting by Fox 8.
    Ashville was not an outlier. Ballotpedia counted 41 local data center measures on the November 3rd ballot across 10 states, with Ohio accounting for 21. Voters favored limiting data center development in 40 of the 41. The one exception was Harwood, North Dakota, where voters defeated a proposed review requirement. Voters in Granville, Ohio, approved a ban by 84%. In Urbana, 77% backed one.

    This was not a one-day mood. A Heatmap poll reported by Forbes found more than 70% of Americans would oppose a data center planned for their area, with rising electricity prices the top reason.
    Many voters may not weigh how much national AI leadership depends on new computing capacity. That is a fair criticism, and we take it seriously below. But the voters who showed up made a different judgment, and it deserves a hearing: they believe this buildout is being driven first by profit, with national strategy a distant second, and that their concerns about power bills and the environment were treated as obstacles rather than inputs.
    The comparison with China shows why that suspicion is not irrational.

    What China Did First
    China and the United States are in a race for AI leadership, but they are not running it from the same starting line.
    According to Inside Climate News, China added an estimated 540 gigawatts of generating capacity in 2025, more than 80% of it renewable. The United States added about 54 gigawatts, roughly 60% renewable. Al Jazeera reports that China already generates more than twice as much electricity as the US, and that BloombergNEF expects China to add more than six times as much generating capacity over the next five years.

    Transmission, the high-voltage lines that carry power from where it is made to where it is used, tells the same story. Grid Strategies estimates the US needs roughly 5,000 new miles of high-capacity transmission per year but has averaged only about 600 since 2017, according to Yale Climate Connections. China, by the same report, has been building over 1,000 miles of ultra-high-voltage lines per year. In January, China’s State Grid announced a CNY 4 trillion (about $580 billion) investment plan for 2026 to 2030, up 40% from the prior plan, including 15 new ultra-high-voltage lines, according to Enerdata.

    Getting connected is the other bottleneck. A ChinaTalk analysis finds that the time for a US generation project to connect has grown from under two years in the early 2000s to over four years for projects built from 2018 to 2024. Because China plans generation, transmission, and demand together under state direction, the American concept of a years-long interconnection queue for large loads barely exists there.

    The US leads on the other side of the equation. Stanford’s AI Index counts an estimated 5,427 US data centers in 2025 versus 449 in China. As one analyst quoted by Al Jazeera framed it, the US has the chips and is short on power, while China has the power and is short on chips.

    Cost is where the picture gets less lopsided. Reporting from bne IntelliNews puts Chinese industrial electricity rates roughly in line with the US, at about $0.08 to $0.11 per kilowatt-hour, while Chinese households pay about $0.08 versus $0.15 to $0.17 for American households. The Financial Times reported that Beijing is subsidizing power for data centers using domestic chips down to about 5.6 cents per kilowatt-hour, against a US industrial average of 9.1 cents.

    The Warnings Were Public
    Here is the part voters understand best. The power shortfall was not a secret.

    In its Long-Term Reliability Assessment, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) raised its ten-year summer peak demand forecast sharply and said new data centers account for most of the projected growth, with several regions at high risk of supply shortfalls by the end of the decade. This spring, NERC issued a Level 3 alert, its highest tier, over large computational loads like data centers, and found that grid operators cannot reliably model how 77% of operating data center load behaves during grid disturbances, according to reporting by SAN and Utility Dive.

    Grid operators are also being overwhelmed at the front door. Texas’s ERCOT built its process for a large-load queue of 40 to 50 projects, then received 225 new interconnection requests in 2025 alone, about 70% of them data centers, according to the Texas Tribune. ERCOT itself cautions that many requests are speculative and its demand forecast is probably inflated. That caution cuts both ways: it means some projects may never be built, and it also means officials are approving and planning against numbers nobody can fully trust.
    We want to be precise. We are not claiming that officials privately concealed a known shortfall. What the public record shows is that independent grid reliability authorities published escalating warnings, and in many places projects advanced anyway, sometimes under nondisclosure agreements and sometimes over local objections. When voters see that sequence, and then see their bills, they draw a conclusion.

    Why the Bill Concern Is Real, and Why It Is Contested
    The electricity price argument is the most contested part of this debate, so it deserves care.

    In PJM, the grid operator serving 13 states and Washington, DC, capacity auction prices rose from $28.92 per megawatt-day for 2024/25 to $329.17 for 2026/27, roughly tenfold. PJM’s independent market monitor attributed 63% of the increase in the 2025/26 auction to data center demand, about $9.3 billion in added costs recovered from ratepayers, according to analysis by the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis.
    But capacity charges are only about 10% to 20% of a typical bill, as FactCheck.org notes, and several studies find no clear nationwide link between data centers and household rate increases. A Rutgers policy lab analysis found no statistically significant local bill effect yet, while warning that “not yet” is not the same as “nothing to worry about.” FactCheck.org also cites an estimate that capacity increases added about $18 per month to the average home bill in western Maryland and $16 in Ohio between mid-2025 and mid-2026, with 63% of that tied to data centers.

    The honest summary: the bill effect is real and documented in some regions, overstated in others, and likely to grow if the cost-allocation rules do not change. Voters are reacting to the direction of travel, and the direction is up.

    “Doesn’t Slowing Down Hand China the Win?”
    This is the strongest objection, and it is not frivolous. If China is building power at this scale and pricing it for AI, then any delay in the US could cost real strategic ground.

    But the China comparison cuts against the current approach, not for it. The binding constraint on American AI is no longer chips alone. It is power, transmission, and public consent, and the backlash of November 3rd shows what happens when a project skips the last of those. Projects imposed on unwilling towns get voted down, and every vote down is a delay no strategist planned for.

    We also want to avoid the lazy conclusion that the US should copy Beijing. China’s model rests on centralized, state-directed planning that the US system, with its many jurisdictions and its commitment to local consent, cannot and should not replicate. China’s buildout has its own costs: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies notes it added as much as 80 gigawatts of new coal-fired power in 2025, and Al Jazeera reports a gap between China’s data center capacity and how much of it is actually used. The lesson is narrower and more useful: China treats the grid as infrastructure to be built before the load arrives. We have been building the load and hoping the grid catches up.

    The Fix: Grid First, Public Accountability Always
    The way out is not a moratorium on AI infrastructure and not a free pass for developers. It is a different order of operations. The framework at Department of Technology proposes layered accountability: a confirmed federal Secretary of Technology, and elected technology leaders at the state, county, and local level who answer to the voters whose bills and water supply are on the line. Concretely:
    Grid first. No major data center approval without a utility- or grid-operator-certified plan covering power supply, transmission, and interconnection timing.

    Make the large loads pay. Require large-load tariffs so the full cost of new generation and grid upgrades lands on the facilities that cause it, not on residential ratepayers. Pennsylvania’s governor has moved this direction with an executive order requiring developers to build, bring, or buy their own capacity, and a Republican challenger has pressed for a ratepayer-protection moratorium. This is not a one-party issue.

    Publish the grid impact. Before any rezoning or tax abatement, publish projected power demand, water use, and cost allocation in plain language, and limit NDAs on projects that use public land, money, or incentives.

    Fund the wires. Treat transmission and interconnection reform as national AI infrastructure, because it is. If the United States wants to out-build China on compute, it has to stop being out-built on the grid.

    What Each of Us Can Do
    Congress: Prioritize transmission permitting and interconnection reform, and pass transparency rules for large-load projects.
    Statehouses and utility commissions: Adopt large-load tariffs and grid-readiness tests before approvals, and require public notice before rezoning or tax breaks.
    Candidates and local officials: Answer two questions in public. Who pays for the power this project needs? Where is the grid study that says it can be delivered?

    Voters: Ask every candidate those same two questions, at every level, before the next ballot.

    The Choice
    The United States can win the AI race, but not by asking communities to host the buildout on faith. China’s advantage is not that it has better engineers. It is that it built the power first. If we want national AI leadership, we have to earn it the way voters just demanded: build the grid, make the costs transparent, and put people accountable to the public in charge of the decisions.

    Summary
    Voters in 40 of 41 local data center ballot measures on November 3rd chose limits, and polls show most Americans oppose a data center near them. The backlash is not a rejection of AI. It reflects a buildout that outran the grid, a shortfall that grid reliability authorities publicly warned about, and a bill impact that is real in some regions and contested in others. China built power and transmission first, at a scale and speed the US has not matched, though its model is not one we should copy. The answer is to put the grid first, make the large loads pay, and make the decisions accountable to the people who live with them.
    Sources

  • Introducing Our New Data Centers Series

    Building the Infrastructure for the MI Era

    The future of Machine Intelligence will not be built on algorithms and chips alone. It will depend on where we build, how we power, and whether we build the infrastructure responsibly.

    We are entering a new technological age. Artificial intelligence is moving rapidly from research labs and specialized applications into nearly every part of our economy and daily lives. We often call this the AI era. But at Department of Technology, we believe a broader term better describes what is unfolding: the MI era—the Machine Intelligence era.

    This is more than a change in terminology. It reflects the scale of the transformation underway. Intelligent machines, increasingly capable computing systems, and the networks connecting them are becoming foundational infrastructure for business, science, education, national security, healthcare, and public services.

    But there is a critical reality that can get lost in the excitement over new models, faster chips, and extraordinary software: Machine Intelligence requires physical infrastructure.

    It requires data centers—large, sophisticated facilities filled with computing equipment that must operate continuously. Those facilities require enormous amounts of electricity, dependable transmission lines, cooling systems, water or other cooling resources, communications networks, skilled workers, secure sites, and communities willing to host them.

    Building this infrastructure will be one of the defining challenges of the MI era.

    That is why we are launching a dedicated Data Centers series.

    The questions America and the world must answer

    We intend to examine the data center challenge through the essential questions that should guide every major infrastructure decision:

    • Who is building these facilities, financing them, operating them, regulating them, and benefiting from them? Who is responsible when costs or consequences fall on local communities?
    • What should a modern data center include—not only in computing capacity, but in power systems, cooling, cybersecurity, physical security, resilience, and environmental performance?
    • When should facilities be built, and how should construction be coordinated with the availability of electricity, transmission capacity, equipment, workers, and other essential resources?
    • Where should data centers be located? Proximity to users and fiber networks matters, but so do available power, transmission access, land, water, climate, permitting, and the needs of surrounding communities.
    • Why are these facilities necessary, what public and economic value can they create, and how do we distinguish essential infrastructure investment from projects that shift costs and risks onto others?
    • How can we build, connect, operate, and expand data centers reliably, affordably, securely, and responsibly?

    These questions are connected. A site that looks attractive because land is available may not have sufficient electrical capacity. A region with abundant generation may lack the transmission infrastructure to deliver power where it is needed. A project that makes sense on paper may encounter public opposition if residents are not given clear information about electricity costs, water use, construction impacts, and long-term commitments.

    There is no single answer that works everywhere. The right approach will depend on local conditions, technology, energy resources, infrastructure, and community priorities.

    The electric grid is part of the AI story

    One of the central themes of this series will be the relationship between data centers and the electrical grid.

    The MI era cannot advance at the speed of software if the infrastructure supplying its electricity cannot keep pace. Generation capacity, transmission lines, substations, interconnection processes, energy storage, backup systems, and grid reliability all matter.

    We must look beyond whether enough electricity exists in the abstract. We must ask whether it can be delivered to the right location, at the right time, at a predictable cost, and with the reliability that modern computing demands.

    We must also examine how new demand affects existing customers. Data center development should not automatically mean higher electricity bills, strained local infrastructure, or reduced reliability for households and established businesses. The costs and benefits must be understood, disclosed, and fairly allocated.

    Building with communities, not simply in them

    Technology leadership cannot be measured only by the number of facilities announced, the amount of capital invested, or the computing capacity installed.

    It must also be measured by whether projects are responsibly planned, whether communities have meaningful information and a voice in decisions, whether infrastructure costs are fairly assigned, and whether the benefits extend beyond the companies operating the facilities.

    Public trust is not an afterthought. It is part of the infrastructure.

    That means transparency about power requirements, water and cooling strategies, environmental impacts, tax arrangements, utility investments, and emergency planning. It means recognizing that communities are not merely locations on a map. They are partners whose long-term interests deserve consideration.

    A practical guide to the infrastructure of the MI era

    In this series, we will explore the data center ecosystem from the ground up: site selection, electricity generation, transmission and distribution, grid connections, cooling, water, energy storage, renewable and other energy sources, reliability, cybersecurity, construction, financing, regulation, workforce development, and the relationship between technology companies and the communities that host their facilities.

    We will look at the roles of federal, state, and local governments, utilities, developers, technology companies, investors, engineers, regulators, and residents. We will examine emerging solutions as well as the obstacles that could slow development or undermine public confidence.

    Our goal is not to advocate for building every proposed data center, nor to oppose development simply because it is large or energy-intensive. Our goal is to help readers understand what responsible development requires—and what questions should be asked before decisions are made.

    America’s ability to lead in Machine Intelligence will depend on more than inventing the next generation of chips and software. It will depend on whether we can build the power systems, networks, facilities, policies, and public partnerships that allow those technologies to operate at scale.

    The MI era needs more than computing power. It needs a plan for the infrastructure that makes computing power possible.

    That is what this series is about.

    Our Data Centers Series

    Where we build, how we power, and whether we build the infrastructure for Machine Intelligence responsibly.

    Introducing Our New Data Centers Series

    Machine Intelligence needs physical infrastructure. Our new Data Centers series asks who builds, finances, powers, and regulates data centers, where they belong, and how local communities can truly benefit. Learn what responsible development requires, from electricity, cooling, and site selection to water use, sustainability, security, workforce needs, and public trust in the Machine Intelligence era.

    Read the introduction →

    Ten Questions Every Candidate and Elected Official Should Answer About Data Centers and AI

    Voters deserve clear, specific answers about who pays for data centers, who is accountable, and what happens if AI does not deliver. This nonpartisan scorecard gives voters, reporters, and candidates ten questions for any office, with evidence, signs of strong and evasive answers, a simple scoring guide, and a print-ready list to send to everyone.

    Read article →

    What Every County Treasurer Should Model Before AI Layoffs

    AI could shrink the labor income that funds local government, while data center revenue can concentrate budgets in one fragile industry. This guide shows county treasurers how to build a simple, practical scenario worksheet: map revenue, run displacement and bust scenarios, set reserves and triggers, and publish the results before layoffs or valuation drops arrive.

    Read article →

    A Technology Leader’s First Year: A Guide for Counties and Cities

    Counties and cities are approving data centers faster than they can possibly study them. This first-year guide for local technology leaders covers what to do each quarter: ending by-right approvals, writing water, noise, and decommissioning rules, joining utility rate proceedings, negotiating community benefit agreements, ending secret deals, and preparing the budget for what comes next.

    Read article →

    Preemption Without an Owner: Why the Federal-State AI Fight Needs Someone Accountable

    Washington is fighting over whether federal law should override state AI rules. Both sides have real arguments. But whoever wins, someone must enforce the result and answer to voters. This analysis lays out the strongest case for and against preemption, what the record actually shows, and three simple tests any national AI standard should meet.

    Read article →

    A Briefing for the New Congress: What the Last Two Years Got Wrong, and What to Do Differently

    The last Congress agreed on almost nothing about AI policy, then watched its one bipartisan data center bill pass the House 417-3 and stall in the Senate. This briefing for new members explains five costly mistakes to avoid, from back-door preemption to election-year gamesmanship, and what a single accountable technology office could realistically do differently.

    Read article →

    How a Data Center Deal Actually Gets Made, and Where the Public Gets Left Out

    From shell companies and code names to secret NDAs and quiet utility requests, most data center deals are usually shaped long before residents hear a word. This step-by-step guide shows how a typical deal gets made, who decides at each stage, where the public is shut out, and what an accountable technology leader would change.

    Read article →

    The First 100 Days: A Technology Agenda for the Next Congress

    A new Congress has 100 days to govern the technology buildout instead of reacting to it. This practical agenda for members of both parties covers ratepayer protection, ending secret data center deals, preparing for AI’s impact on federal revenue, and creating a single point of accountability, with the evidence and key objections behind each step.

    Read article →

    The Data Center Casino: Why America Needs Elected Technology Leaders Now

    America needs more data centers, but both parties have treated them like a casino: chasing tax breaks and investment while ignoring grid strain, bubble risk, China’s power advantage, and AI job losses that threaten the tax base. See why elected technology leaders at every level are needed right now to build smarter, safer, and fairer.

    Read article →

    Voters Didn’t Reject AI. They Rejected Building It Backward

    Voters didn’t reject AI. They rejected building it backward. After 40 of 41 data center ballot measures favored limits on November 3rd, see how rising power bills, strained grids, and secret deals fueled the backlash, how China’s energy buildout compares, and what transparent, accountable planning could do to restore public trust in America’s AI future.

    Read article →

    Powering the AI Revolution

    Discover why America’s AI data center future depends on a reliable electrical grid. Explore how data center location, electricity generation, transmission infrastructure, grid capacity, energy storage, backup power, and renewable energy shape the next generation of AI infrastructure. Learn why reliable electricity, responsible planning, and community impact are essential to powering the Machine Intelligence era.

    Read article →

    An Open Letter to Every Elected Official in America: Put the Country First

    An open letter urging Democrats, Republicans, and every elected official to start a nationwide public discussion on creating a Department of Technology at the local, county, state, and federal levels. Learn why AI data centers, secret NDAs, and conflicts of interest demand accountable, nonpartisan technology leadership before the next major data center contracts are signed.

    Read article →

    America Won’t Lose the AI Race to China’s Chips. It Will Lose It to Distrust.

    America won’t lose the AI race to China’s chips. It will lose it to distrust. After nearly 40 data center ballot measures in 2026, voters are demanding transparency, accountability, and reliable, affordable power. Learn how conflicts of interest, grid limits, and secret deals threaten U.S. AI leadership, and what a Department of Technology could change.

    Read article →
    View all Data Centers articles →