By the Founders, Department of Technology | San Diego, California | November 13, 2026
Our proposal for elected technology leaders at every level of government draws the same skeptical question again and again: aren’t you just adding a layer? It is a fair question. Here are the nine hardest objections we hear, with our best answers and the limits of those answers.
We would rather be challenged than applauded. If an idea cannot survive its strongest critics, it should not become law. Where we have evidence, we cite it. Where we are making a judgment, we say so.
1. Isn’t this just another layer of bureaucracy?
It would be, if it added a layer without removing a gap. The gap is the problem. Today, the pieces of the technology buildout are split across utility commissions, economic development offices, zoning boards, treasurers and workforce agencies, and no one answers to voters for how they fit together. An NBC News review of more than 30 data center proposals in 14 states found that in a majority of cases local officials signed NDAs and worked with what appeared to be shell companies. That is not what a coordinated system looks like. Our test for any new office is whether it replaces confusion with accountability. If it does not, it should not exist. We also think a new office should come with a published cost estimate and a sunset review. We have not priced it for your jurisdiction, and you should be wary of anyone who claims to have done so without details.
2. Why elected? Why not appoint someone?
Because the decisions are value judgments. Whose land, whose power bills and whose jobs are tradeoffs, not technical questions, and voters should be able to hold someone to account for them. There is precedent. Voters elect utility commissioners in 10 states, and on November 3 voters in nine states elected 14 members of their state utility commissions. That is not an untested idea. But the record also contains a warning: those races draw far less public attention than other contests on the same ballot, even though the winners will help decide whether data center costs are passed to existing ratepayers. And S&P’s regulatory research unit has long attributed greater investor risk to states where commissioners are elected. So election alone does not guarantee accountability. It needs visibility, and we would pair it with the transparency rules we describe elsewhere.
3. Don’t utility commissions and other regulators already do this?
They do part of it, and in some places they do it well. Virginia’s State Corporation Commission, for example, ordered Dominion to develop a tariff to assign more transmission costs directly to data centers. But a utility commission sets rates. It does not decide where a facility is zoned, how much water it may use, what tax breaks it receives or how a county prepares its budget for a downturn. The proposal is not to replace regulators. It is for a technology leader to participate in their proceedings, and to coordinate across the decisions that no single regulator owns.
4. Won’t an elected technology leader be captured by the industry?
It is a real risk, and it is a risk for any regulator, elected or appointed. Campaign money, revolving doors and information asymmetry all push in one direction. We would counter it with rules, not hope: publish meetings and calendars, bar NDAs, require recusal where there is a financial interest, and open the records. Those safeguards are our suggestions, not a guarantee. A reasonable person can conclude that appointed, professional regulators are safer than elected ones, and that is a debate we welcome.
5. Will they have the expertise?
Not automatically. Elections reward name recognition more than engineering. Some states already set minimum qualifications for commissioners; a Platte Institute research note observes that some states require knowledge or experience in fields such as economics, finance, engineering, energy and law. We would consider something similar, along with a funded professional staff, so that the elected official is accountable for the decisions and the staff supplies the analysis.
6. Won’t this slow down the buildout and hand China the lead?
It should not, and if it does, the design has failed. Speed matters. Our concern is that speed without accountability produces backlash that stops projects anyway, as voters showed on November 3 when they favored limits in 40 of 41 local data center measures. Clear rules can also speed things up: AEP Ohio’s large-load pipeline reportedly fell from roughly 30 GW to 13 GW once it had a tariff, which suggests that rules can weed out speculative requests that waste everyone’s time. And Loudoun County credits favorable zoning and fast approvals for accelerating its data center growth. A good technology leader should make the process predictable and fast for projects that meet the standards.
7. What will it cost?
We do not have a number for your jurisdiction, and we would not trust one without a detailed budget. The fair comparison is with the cost of the current arrangement, though that is not proof of savings. In Ohio, for example, Policy Matters Ohio reports that a single tax break cost state and local governments about $2 billion in a year, well above the state’s forecast. A small county could begin with a staff director and a part-time advisory board and expand only if it proves its worth.
8. Isn’t this a partisan project?
It is not meant to be, and the evidence we rely on is bipartisan. In Virginia, 21 Democrats and seven Republicans in the state Senate voted to curtail a data center tax break. Republican Governor Mike DeWine paused Ohio’s break, and Democratic Governor Andy Beshear called for ending Kentucky’s. Skeptics of the buildout and enthusiasts for it both need an accountable referee. We will count the proposal a failure if one party sees it as a weapon.
9. Why not let states and markets sort it out?
They will sort out something. In 2026, 29 states enacted AI legislation, and many local officials are negotiating one deal at a time against a handful of very large buyers, often under NDAs. A patchwork can be a healthy laboratory, and a federal standard may eventually be the right answer. Either way, the people who live next to the project need someone whose job is to speak for them across every decision, not just the one in front of a given committee.
What would change our mind
We care about the function more than the title. If a jurisdiction shows that a staff-level technology director, a joint committee or an existing regulator can deliver one accountable owner for the whole picture, with public records and a name voters can hold responsible, we would support that model. If evidence shows elected technology leaders performing worse than appointed ones, we will say so. What we will not accept is the status quo, in which nobody is responsible. Our proposal is at department.technology/.
